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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 The transportation system is an important network established to ensure the 
mobility of people and goods between destinations.  In addition, it also serves a vital role 
in responding to disasters, and therefore deserves special attention when those disasters 
threaten to decrease its support capability.  The importance of maintaining this capability 
is highlighted by the inclusion of transportation system security as a separate planning 
factor in the 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A 
Legacy for Users legislation.   
 Yet the task of securing a transportation system consisting of multiple 
interconnecting assets is a difficult responsibility.  It requires the ability to negotiate the 
balance between mobility and security in cooperation with multiple stakeholders and 
interests.  It also faces important challenges such as coordinating the various interests and 
sources of information related to security planning, generating funding for security 
improvements or operations, and creating standards that ensure security plans exist on 
compatible platforms.   
 As an owner and operator of major transportation infrastructure, state 
Departments of Transportation (DOTs) have a vested interest in ensuring this balance and 
represent an important mediator between federal and local interests, assuming nine key 
security planning roles in their traditional transportation planning duties: Coordinator, 
Analyzer/Planner, Financial Administrator, Infrastructure Owner, Infrastructure Operator, 
Implementer, Regulator, Information Provider, and Influencer.  Through their internal 
x 
vulnerability assessments, the departments already perform a vital security planning 
function that can support their own planning efforts as well as others.   
 Incorporating security into the transportation planning process should be an 
ongoing effort of the state DOT, requiring modification as feedback of implementation 
methods is received.  It does not mean transforming this transportation agency into a 
security agency, but rather incorporating a security perspective into the analysis of the 
system.  This first involves establishing a more solid role as a coordinator in order to 
solidify vital linkages between agencies relevant to security planning.  This interaction 
should reveal standardization issues the DOT can address in order to ensure effective 
collaboration, communication and coordination.  Funding security measures may be 
difficult; but by incorporating security measures into initial analyzation and planning 
processes, they can be brought into the broader concept of the system rather than simply 
added as additional funding needs.  The nine roles suggested earlier offer opportunities 
for state DOTs to overcome these and other challenges faced in the process of 
incorporating security into the transportation planning process.  Through these roles, state 
DOTs can ensure that security efforts reach the parts of the system that require them and 
begin to build a more secure system.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 The U.S. transportation system consists of multiple interconnected assets 
including highways, transit systems, railroads, airports, waterways, pipelines and ports, as 
well as the vehicles, aircraft, and vessels that interact with these assets.  
Interdependencies exist between the transportation system and nearly every other sector 
of the economy, and it provides the backbone for maintaining important public works and 
government functions. Consequently, maintaining the security of the system is essential 
to America's continued economic prosperity because a threat to the transportation system 
can have a broad impact on everything it supports.  Bridges alone currently account for a 
potential $10 billion impact from the loss of one of the 1000 bridges listed as critical to 
the U.S. (1).  However, enhancing security can adversely affect mobility.  The post-9/11 
passenger aviation experience in the U.S. is one example of the delicate balance between 
security efforts and maintaining mobility, evidenced by the increase in total travel time 
associated with airport security checkpoints.  Maintaining this balance is not an easy task 
as it involves multiple stakeholders that may complicate and inhibit the security planning 
process.  For instance, despite the relatively quick post-9/11 legislative action supporting 
transportation security such as the USA Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act, 
states are still facing funding issues for surface transportation security improvements 
several years later (2).   
As an owner and operator of major transportation infrastructure, state 
Departments of Transportation (DOTs), have a vested interest in the continued operation 
of the transportation system as a whole (in contrast to a transit agency for example, 
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whose primary focus is on the local transit system) and therefore are concerned with the 
system’s resilience to multiple types of threats.  As a planner and implementer of system 
components such as Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) technologies and evacuation 
route models, DOTs also possess the resources to evaluate and enhance the system.  
Although security planning cannot be left to a single agency due to its complexity, it 
seems that DOTs have the motivation and ability to unite the various security interests 
into a unified front; yet they currently do not.   
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the environment in which transportation 
security planning currently exists at the level of the state DOT, as well as examine any 
issues or barriers related to the implementation of an effective security assessment and 
countermeasure program.  This analysis involves determining the current as well as 
possible roles state DOTs assume in relation to other agencies in order to identify where 
they can be most effective in the security analysis process.  Because there is very little 
existing literature specifically addressing the role of state DOTs in the security planning 
process, this analysis is based on multiple sources addressing particular issues in security 
planning as well as interviews with security planning officials at selected state DOTs.  
Four roles have already been suggested (Owner, Operator, Planner, Implementer), and an 
analysis of the issues will bring to light other possible roles, as well as allow for 
comparison of these roles against each other.  
The following chapter introduces the conceptual framework that transportation 
security planning will be examined in, establishing the position of state DOTs in relation 
to other agencies involved in the same endeavor.  Chapter 3 discusses the complications 
involved in planning for disasters within the transportation environment, specifically 
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examining established emergency response practices among both the U.S. DOT and state 
DOTs, and their relationship with one another.  Chapter 4 then moves to the pre-disaster 
phase, examining the process of assessing the vulnerability of critical transportation 
assets.  Chapter 5 combines personal interviews of state DOT security planning personnel 
with recent literature examining unresolved issues in security planning, and uses this 
information to explore the opportunities for state DOTs to improve this planning through 
the roles presented in Chapter 2.  Chapter 6 provides a summary analysis of these issues, 
with recommendations following in Chapter 7. 
It is important to note that although the term “security” is used, this analysis is not 
specifically focused on activities developed in response to criminal or terrorist events.  
Instead, “security” is used here also in relation to the threat of environmental hazards and 
natural occurrences, representing the degree to which the transportation system and its 
operators can effectively anticipate and respond to various disasters.   
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Chapter 2:  
Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 shows the relative position of state DOTs with respect to other agencies 
involved in transportation security planning and emergency management, and defines 
nine roles the DOT can assume through its authority or function.  The National Response 
Framework, which outlines the principles that guide federal and local agencies in a 
unified response to emergencies, identifies 38 different agencies involved in disaster 
response (3).  However, this discussion is limited to the transportation environment, and 
therefore is concerned specifically with state DOTs and the agencies it must coordinate 
with during its planning process.   
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Figure 1: The position and roles of the state DOT 
 
 
 
 The federal government—through agencies such as the U.S. DOT, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Department of Homeland Security 
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(DHS)—oversees the three agencies directly involved in emergency response planning 
within the transportation environment (Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs), state 
Departments of Transportation, and law enforcement agencies), providing general 
guidance through federal mandates in addition to serving as primary coordinators during 
national emergencies.  In order to plan for their specific role in an emergency, the state 
DOT needs to coordinate with the state EMA, which establishes the general system for 
coordinating state response to disasters, and law enforcement agencies, whose security 
knowledge and expertise helps inform the security planning process.  In return, the state 
DOT can provide critical information to these agencies, the federal government, and 
other agencies as to the characteristics of the transportation system during an emergency.  
In this manner, the state DOT is both influenced by and influences coordinating agencies 
and federal agencies.  
 Figure 1 also highlights in blue the nine roles state DOTs assume in ensuring the 
effectiveness of the transportation system during a disaster.  Through coordination with 
relevant agencies and targeted use of its budget, the state DOT is able to plan and 
implement strategies to protect its infrastructure and its users during and after a disaster.  
System analysis allows the DOT to obtain the information it needs to inform disaster 
response; and by regulating its infrastructure, the DOT is also able to influence the use of 
transportation infrastructure in accordance with disaster plans. Although these roles may 
appear hierarchical in the flow chart, in reality this is not the case.  However, these roles 
can be broken up into two categories.  Five of these roles (Coordinator, Analyzer/Planner, 
Financial Administrator, and Infrastructure Owner/Operator) represent opportunities for 
the DOT to change within its organization in order to more fluidly incorporate security 
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into planning, while four of them (Implementer, Regulator, Information Provider, and 
Influencer) define how those internal changes will be reflected in a more secure 
transportation system.  A brief description of each role is presented below.  A more 
thorough discussion of these two categories is presented in the analysis and 
recommendations sections as they relate to the changing role of security in the 
transportation planning process.  
• Coordinator – in the process of serving the public interest and implementing 
strategies to improve the state transportation system, the state DOT often must 
bring together multiple interested parties to develop a unified plan supported by 
multiple modes.   
• Analyzer/Planner – in order to implement an effective statewide transportation 
plan, the state DOT must first obtain and evaluate transportation system 
information in order to ensure that future projects support a sustainable system. 
• Financial Administrator – as the major distributor of transportation funds, the 
State DOT funnels money from the federal government to important projects. 
• Implementer – the DOT not only determines the structure of the transportation 
system through its planning and analysis, it also influences the transportation 
environment (both its own and others) through the actual implementation of 
those plans. 
• Infrastructure Owner – the state DOT is the major investor in transportation 
infrastructure (although other agencies also invest), providing the impetus to 
protect its investment. 
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• Infrastructure Operator – the state DOT not only owns transportation 
infrastructure but also operates it, providing the opportunity to implement 
operational strategies to security challenges. 
• Regulator – by regulating the use of the transportation system that the state DOT 
owns and operates, it has the opportunity to influence that use as it relates to 
security issues. 
• Information Provider – the state DOT collects and provides information on the 
transportation system for its own use in planning and operation, but also 
provides this information to system users and emergency responders in times of 
emergency to facilitate mobility and recovery. 
• Influencer – through its actions in each of the aforementioned roles, the state DOT 
influences the transportation environment, shaping its ability to effectively 
respond to disasters. 
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Chapter 3: 
Characteristics of the Transportation Security Planning Environment 
 
 
 
Planning for disasters is a complicated and multi-faceted task.  Transportation 
assets are vulnerable to both planned attacks, such as a terrorist or criminal acts, and 
natural disasters, such as being in the path of a hurricane.  Terrorist acts alone represent a 
difficult planning situation considering the multiple possible objectives of such attacks 
(e.g. taking lives or destroying economic assets) in conjunction with numerous potential 
targets, from roadways to railways to airways, etc.  Confounding this problem is the 
difficulty in obtaining information in relation to terrorist threats in comparison to natural 
disasters, since these actions rely on human decision making rather than a combination of 
natural occurrences.  These kinds of events may even occur without reason, increasing 
the difficulty in predicting vulnerability. 
Planning for a natural disaster is no less complicated.  This is represented by the 
ongoing efforts to characterize and resolve the issues faced during and after Hurricane 
Katrina (4).  Natural disasters such as hurricanes or tornadoes carry an additional 
complexity because their targets may not be as predictable as terrorist targets.  In 
addition, although a natural disaster may not affect the most important parts of the 
transportation system, the importance of the system as a whole lies in the fact that it is an 
interconnected system; therefore emergency response may depend on the parts of the 
system that, though they are not nationally or even locally significant, will hinder the 
effectiveness of first responders if destroyed in a disaster. 
Planning for disasters is further complicated by the characteristics of the system 
components.  Fixed-guideway transit services such as commuter rail and subways offer 
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higher passenger capacity over other methods, but are restricted to particular routes and 
have little flexibility to respond to an emergency situation on those routes.  Highway and 
road systems offer the redundancy not found in rail systems, but the smaller capacity of 
individual vehicles coupled with a tendency to underutilize this capacity could also lead 
to problems during an emergency.  The Houston evacuation prior to Hurricane Rita is one 
example where motorists were trapped on the highway because too many people tried to 
use it at the same time, clogging the road network and restricting movement for up to 48 
hours (5).  This is not to suggest that a rail system would have fared better, given that its 
evacuation capabilities are limited by the extent of the rail system.   
The complicated nature of planning for a disaster, as well as the multitude of 
interests and stakeholders involved in responding to disasters, leads to the need to 
characterize the transportation system and its components in order to effectively plan for 
an emergency, as well as identify the organizational roles that are required in maintaining 
the essential functions of the transportation system during disruption.  This complexity is 
reflected at the national level in the consolidation of dozens of emergency-management-
related agencies into the Department of Homeland Security; whereas at the local level, 
“entities become even more numerous and the interactions more complex...typically, no 
single agency is responsible for transportation security” (6).  State DOTs hold a crucial 
position as a mediator between local stakeholders, such as law enforcement, Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations (MPOs), and federal agencies.  For instance, vulnerability 
assessments of state transportation infrastructure performed by a DOT can be combined 
with information from local agencies in prevention and response strategies, as well as 
funneled to the federal government to prepare for or respond to national disasters.   
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Many of the elements of security planning, such as vulnerability assessment 
methods and DOT emergency operations plans, already exist.  However, these elements 
are generally not combined in a concerted planning effort.  The Transportation Equity 
Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) introduced safety and security as one of seven 
federally mandated planning factors in 1998, but security was combined with another 
objective (safety) rather than receiving its own emphasis.  Given the relatively small 
number of domestic terrorism incidents in the U.S. (regardless of their severity), it is not 
surprising that many DOTs and MPOs focused more heavily on safety than security.  The 
amount of information related to safety incidents is much greater, and much less guarded, 
than that for security, and the intensity of its use has been a planning fundamental at least 
since the Highway Safety Act of 1966.   
The events of September 11, 2001 elevated domestic security planning and 
prevention to a priority level, causing many transportation organizations such as the 
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), the 
Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) and the National Cooperative Highway 
Research Program (NCHRP) to review and press for updates to transportation security 
planning.  However, a 2005 NCHRP report that evaluated the extent to which security 
was considered in the transportation planning process of DOTs and MPOs found “limited 
evidence that security has yet been given major priority in plans and programs of either 
the states or the metropolitan areas”(6).  The 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) attempted to address 
this situation by separating safety and security as independent planning considerations in 
both metropolitan and statewide planning processes.  Although security is separated from 
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safety in SAFETEA-LU, it is listed as a secondary benefit of other concerns such as ITS 
research for information purposes or congestion mitigation, rather than a primary goal 
with supporting measures.  This is not to say that this information gathering is 
unimportant, but it highlights the fact that little guidance is provided in terms of 
establishing security planning.  Security was also highlighted as a needed component of 
federal research, but was not given dedicated funding.   
 
3.1 National DOT Security Planning 
At both the national and local levels, transportation agencies typically hold 
supporting roles in emergency response plans as the most knowledgeable source for the 
information necessary to move first responders into and out of an incident site, evacuate 
citizens, and generally maintain mobility.  Under the Federal Catastrophic Incident 
National Response Plan (NRP-CI), the U.S. Department of Transportation—in 
conjunction with several other federal departments such as the Department of Agriculture 
or the Department of Defense, as well as civilian organizations such as the American Red 
Cross—is responsible for initiating actions to mobilize and deploy resources necessary to 
respond to a catastrophic incident such as medical equipment and search and rescue 
teams.  The DOT specifically acts as the Department of Homeland Security’s primary 
source of transportation-related information as DHS initiates the National Response 
Framework.  Designated as Emergency Support Function #1 (of 15 FEMA designated 
support functions), the fundamental responsibilities of the Department of Transportation 
during a catastrophic event include “managing transportation systems and infrastructure, 
including regulation of transportation, management of the Nation’s airspace, and ensuring 
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the safety and security of the national transportation system” (7).  This annex is provided 
in Appendix A. 
All of these responsibilities are performed under the direction of DHS, and are 
only begun once DHS has declared a particular incident as “catastrophic.”  The DOT 
essentially acts as a point of contact for transportation information, monitoring and 
absorbing information on the status of the transportation system (including infrastructure) 
and reporting it to the DHS.  The DOT is also supposed to identify alternative 
transportation solutions in the event that some systems are incapacitated, as well as 
coordinate the recovery of those systems; however, the response plan specifically states 
that the DOT is “not responsible for the movement of goods, equipment, animals, or 
people,” and that it is DHS that “is responsible for providing transportation assets and 
services (including contracts or other agreements for transportation assistance) for 
responders, equipment, and goods” (7). Although state DOTs are a significant source of 
local transportation-related information, no specific plan for linking the national and state 
DOT is outlined in this plan, other than the general designation of the U.S. DOT as a 
coordinating agency. 
Under U.S. DOT Order 1900.9, enacted in 2000, the U.S. DOT outlined a 
somewhat more definitive position and set of priorities before, during and after an 
emergency.  The U.S. DOT states that it will develop and maintain policies that ensure 
the continued operation of the transportation system, facilitate the repair of any part of 
the system that is damaged during a catastrophic incident, and provide or make available 
transportation resources in response to an emergency.  The Order designates 
transportation system disruptions as a specific responsibility of each U.S. DOT employee, 
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and also places responsibility for ensuring communications capabilities for emergency 
responders on the U.S. DOT.  Significantly, this document defines a relationship between 
the national DOT and state DOTs in terms of both responding to and planning for an 
emergency.  One of the U.S. DOT’s priorities is to collaborate with appropriate 
organizations (such as state DOTs, law enforcement agencies, and other federal agencies) 
in ensuring that the national transportation system is prepared for emergencies.  This 
document also states that the U.S. DOT will respond to emergency transportation 
requests in a manner consistent with priorities established by state as well as federal 
authorities.  Federal intervention is still viewed as something to be reserved for 
significant incidents—just as in the NRP-CI—indicating that local DOTs are still the 
focal point for transportation-related emergency response until they are overwhelmed.  
However, unlike the NRP-CI, the U.S. DOT, in addition to outlining the specific roles 
within its agency, also considers how it will interact with state DOTs affected by the 
emergency, establishing an important link that will provide the federal agencies with 
necessary transportation information.  Overall, the U.S. DOT retains the same oversight 
position as that outlined in the NRP-CI, but the position in relation to both local agencies 
beneath it and federal agencies above it is more clearly defined. 
 
3.2 State DOT Security Planning  
State DOTs serve a similar role with regard to State Emergency Response plans, 
with the exception that it is usually the State Office of Emergency Management (OEM) 
overseeing the governmental response.  The OEM develops an all-hazards plan that 
provides the same fundamental approach to addressing various types of man-made or 
natural hazards, defining the roles and responsibilities of the various state agencies and 
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authorities under the direction of the OEM.  In addition, modified or more detailed plans 
are developed for threats that may be specific to certain regions or that require particular 
attention such as hurricanes or nuclear accidents.  These additional plans are called 
annexes.  After 9/11, AASHTO urged many DOTs to include terrorist incidents as an 
annex because they may require a different response or involve additional support 
agencies (such as law enforcement) than those already included in the general plan (8).   
 Typically, the OEM will use the Incident Command System (ICS) when 
responding to emergencies.  The ICS provides a common set of objectives and strategies 
supported by a collective set of management principles, such as unity of command, which 
solidifies participants under a particular supervisor rather than multiple or changing 
supervisors, or common terminology, which clearly defines language and phrasing for 
communications among agencies that may not normally work together.  Within this 
organizational structure, the DOT usually serves as the lead agency for transportation 
logistics.  This means that the DOT should serve a vital role in almost any emergency 
response, given that most emergencies will require mobile responders, movement of 
goods and support vehicles, or the evacuation of those affected by the emergency.  This 
effort may involve establishing the condition and potential for mobility along necessary 
routes, as well as designating the proper routes and restricting or issuing permits for these 
routes.  Because the DOT should be able to characterize effectively the status of mobility 
along necessary routes, its primary responsibility within an OEM emergency plan is in 
support of many of the agencies involved in responding to an incident, especially law 
enforcement and emergency responders.  The DOT also provides support in estimating 
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the potential for reconstruction or rehabilitation of the affected transportation system after 
assessing any mobility restrictions.   
3.2.1 State Emergency Operations Plans 
 
Most state Emergency Response Plans list the DOT as one of the supporting 
agencies in the event of an incident. However, it is one among many agencies, and its 
specific responsibilities are not always clarified.  In response, many state DOTs develop 
internal Emergency Operations Plans (EOP) that detail the responsibilities within the 
department as they relate to the transportation system.  These plans include general 
procedures that mirror the state emergency management plan, but also address specific 
DOT responsibilities and activities in separate annexes.  These annexes may include 
operations center plans detailing the procedure for assigning and notifying DOT 
personnel to emergency operations centers as well as activating the center, resource 
management plans providing details on emergency equipment and facilities and how 
resources can be transferred, traffic management plans detailing the procedures for using 
the roads and highways for evacuations, and hazard-specific plans that provide 
procedures for hazards specific to the area and protocol for dealing with large gatherings 
of people pre- or post-catastrophe.  
 As part of the EOP, most DOTs specify the particular role they will assume 
among four different scenarios: as a first responder to an incident, within the broader 
context of the particular incident; as a surveyor and manager of the transportation system 
during and after an incident; and as a source of transportation system status information 
for the other agencies and the public.  The EOP provides the DOT with guidelines to 
follow once an emergency has been declared, regardless of whether directives have been 
16 
given and without having to wait for instructions.  In a survey of state DOTs, AASHTO 
summarized the roles DOTs defined for themselves for the four different scenarios (8): 
First Response 
• Assist with evacuation of persons from immediate peril. 
• Transport materials, personnel, and supplies in support of emergency activities.  
Assistance may include transporting resources from state agencies, from local 
governments from other parts of the state, or from private commercial companies. 
• Assist in the design and implementation of alternate transportation services, such as 
mass transit systems, to temporarily replace transport capacity lost to disaster 
damage. 
• Assess the condition of highways, bridges, tunnels and other components of the state's 
transportation infrastructure and: 
- Close those determined to be unsafe; 
- Post signing and barricades; 
- Notify law enforcement and emergency management personnel; 
- Protect, maintain and restore critical transportation routes and facilities; and 
- Develop detour routings as appropriate. 
• Assess and report impacts to airports, ports, and marine facilities in the disaster area. 
• Conduct aerial reconnaissance and photographic missions, provided resources are 
available. 
• Provide hazardous materials containment response and damage assessment. 
• Coordinate roadway clearance activities and prioritize and perform emergency repairs 
in the disaster area. Assist local governments in related repair activities. 
• Remove and/or assist in debris removal and disposal, as appropriate, to provide 
emergency access to disaster areas or to assist in eliminating health and safety 
problems associated with debris. 
• Coordinate state agency efforts in support of utility restoration. 
• Issue permits required to repair/restore utility lines or pipes that are immediately 
adjacent to, or run over or under state highways. 
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• Provide needed equipment and/or technical assistance in support of the restoration of 
critical public works. 
 
Concept of Operations 
• Implement DOT emergency functions for the prioritization and/or allocation of state 
resources necessary to maintain and restore the state's transportation infrastructure. 
• Provide all available and obtainable transportation resource support including: 
- Transportation equipment, e.g., passenger and utility vans, trucks and/or 
trailers; aircraft, aircrews, and ground and operations personnel and 
communications for transportation of emergency officials; 
- Transportation facilities, e.g., vehicle repair facilities, equipment, and 
personnel; fleet parking and storage areas to be used for staging, parking, 
and storage of emergency vehicles; motor pool and vehicle service facilities 
and personnel for refueling and servicing emergency vehicles; 
- Vehicular traffic management and control signs and devices e.g., barriers, 
cones, of various types; 
- Vehicular traffic flow data and information from permanent and temporary 
monitoring sites. 
• Assign personnel to emergency operations center(s) to coordinate with and assist law 
enforcement agencies and other agencies involved in evacuation efforts.  
 
System Surveillance and Management 
• Monitor and control transportation systems and infrastructure, and coordinate 
transportation activities with other agencies (local, state, and Federal). 
• Provide traffic control assistance. 
• Assist state and local government entities in determining the most viable available 
transportation networks to, from, and within the disaster area and regulate the use of 
those networks for the movement of people, equipment, supplies, records, etc. 
• Identify specific traffic management actions to maintain a smooth flow for evacuation 
routes and transport of emergency resources, including traffic control points, 
barricade plans, and potential one-way/reverse lane operations. 
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• Provide any highway clearances and waivers required to expedite the transportation of 
high-priority materials and the evacuation of personnel during periods of declared 
emergencies. 
• Coordinate the closure of high-risk roadways such as bridges, tunnels, or flood prone 
sections of roadway.  
 
Agency Communications 
• Provide communications resources in support of statewide operations Public 
Information. 
• Provide information on road closures, infrastructure damage, debris removal, and 
restoration activities related to highway systems and facilities. 
• Provide real-time traffic counter data and traffic reports for roads within the affected 
area or on roads leading into the area. 
• Assign appropriate personnel at key disaster sites to oversee operations and to provide 
consistent, verified public information to emergency management agencies, public 
information officers, and the media. When evacuation plans have been implemented, 
inform motorists which routes and intersections will lead to host shelters. 
         
3.2.2 Continuity of Operations Plans 
 
As the previous list indicates, state DOT Emergency Operations plans typically 
cover agency operations during and after a major incident, but they do not include plans 
for carrying out these responsibilities over periods of time longer than the occurrence of 
the incident or from locations or facilities other than those normally utilized by the DOT.  
If an incident also disrupts internal DOT operations such that essential functions must be 
reassigned to different personnel, relocated to an unfamiliar setting, or are rendered 
impossible, the DOT’s Continuity of Operations (COOP) plan is the guideline for 
carrying out critical services under diminished operating capacity.  Because not all 
incidents will severely incapacitate the internal functioning of a DOT, the COOP plan is 
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enacted separately from the EOP in response to particular events.  In the 2005 guide to 
establishing a COOP, TCRP and NCHRP defined five situations that trigger the use of 
the COOP, encompassing internal losses that would restrict the DOT’s ability to respond 
to an emergency: “denial of use of facilities, loss of power, loss of telecommunications, 
suddenly unavailable personnel, or inaccessible information technology systems” (9).   
 Most DOT COOP plans are based on the post 9/11 FEMA circular Continuity of 
Operations Federal Preparedness Circular 65, which defines the COOP as an effort to 
ensure that agencies continue operating in support or lead capacity under a wide range of 
emergency situations (9).  The typical DOT COOP plan outlines a strategy for 
performing essential functions in the event that facilities, vehicles, systems, or senior 
management or technical personnel are incapacitated or lost.  These functions are vital to 
ensuring that emergency responders and management agencies are able to perform their 
duties during an emergency, as well as important in maintaining the safety of civilian 
system users, and typically encompass the “minimum legal, public safety, operational and 
maintenance, and public information requirements” (9).  In order to maintain these 
functions, DOT COOP plans typically stipulate the formation of a replacement command 
unit immediately following an event that triggers the COOP plan.  In the event that senior 
management personnel are unable to perform their duties, the unit will be comprised of 
previously determined personnel assigned to specific functions. This unit is expected to 
resume essential functions within 12 hours of an emergency, as well as execute additional 
functions as systems, facilities or personnel become available.  The unit may continue its 
duties for up to 30 days or until normal operations resume, but the plan assumes that the 
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organization will be restored or re-established by the 30-day mark, signifying the 
temporary nature of the unit.     
To ensure the ability to carry out essential functions, COOP planning guides 
encourage the use and designation of alternative facilities, procedures and personnel.  
Alternative facilities can include secondary sites where monitoring and management can 
be performed, separate maintenance facilities that can accommodate vehicles whose 
garages are destroyed, and separate sites where operating records are stored in case 
originals are destroyed.  COOP planning guides also encourage the creation of alternative 
procedures that will be temporarily used to perform essential functions.  Examples of 
these procedures include using transportation and law enforcement personnel to direct 
traffic if signals do not work, manually running automated train control systems, and 
giving bus operators pre-assigned routes in the event that communication is lost.  The 
delegation of authority during an emergency is also critical in the development of a 
COOP guide, since time and communication can inhibit the establishment of a command 
structure post-disaster.  COOP planning guides suggest the development of an order of 
succession that establishes authority in the event that certain DOT members are lost, 
ensuring that decisions continue to be made. 
Upon establishing a COOP plan, a major factor in the successful implementation 
of the plan is training.  Training DOT personnel in the procedures they will follow during 
an emergency ensures the quick application of the COOP guidelines, guaranteeing that 
essential functions will be performed.  The lessons learned by various transportation 
agencies during the events of 9/11 provide examples of how proper training can ensure 
the execution of COOP objectives.  Using alternative facilities to store vital documents in 
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multiple places, as well as within secured online sites, became an unfortunate lesson 
when critical emergency response plans stored at the World Trade Center were lost.  
However, it also highlighted the importance of training; transportation and transit 
employees knew the proper procedures to maintain operations because they had recently 
completed an all-hazards training exercise that prepared them for the emergency.  
Training also proved important after multiple lines of communication, as well as the 
inherent chaotic nature of the terrorist attack, limited the exchange of system updates or 
directives among transportation personnel. Instead, many relied on the emergency 
procedures instilled during drills, which resulted in a faster response to the situation and 
less time wasted in deciding how to respond (10). 
Once the COOP plan has been triggered, the plan follows three distinct phases: 
activation and relocation, alternate operating facility operations, and reconstitution.  The 
establishment of the three phases within the plan is intended to focus and organize the 
attempt to restore the DOT once an emergency has happened. They represent the major 
objectives of the COOP plan, which is to maintain essential DOT functions while 
restoring the DOT to normal operating standards.  The activation and relocation phase 
typically occurs within the first 12 hours after the COOP plan has been activated, and 
consists of notifying the necessary DOT personnel and specific local authorities of their 
respective responsibilities in maintaining essential DOT functions, as well as moving to 
the respective alternate locations and requesting any additional equipment or supplies that 
will be necessary.  After this initial 12-hour phase, the alternate facility/work site 
operations phase can consume the next 30 days.  After notifying the appropriate 
emergency management authorities of the DOT relocation due to the activation of the 
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COOP plan, the majority of this phase consists of re-organizing DOT personnel.  
Employees not accounted for during the initial emergency are processed as they are 
received, and responsibilities are transferred to these employees according to the plan.  
Some employees’ responsibilities may shift in accordance with the plan, and some 
employees may need to act as replacements for missing personnel, and these employees 
are guided through this process (although no information is given in the planning 
guidelines as to whose responsibility this is).  As the situation becomes more stable, a 
redeployment plan is developed with the intention of phasing down the alternate facility, 
leading to phase three.  The reconstitution phase consists of informing all personnel of 
the termination of the COOP plan and the return to normal DOT operations.  This phase 
may or may not consist of returning to the original facility, depending on damage, but is 
intended to involve the establishment of a permanent facility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
Chapter 4:  
Assessing and Quantifying Vulnerability 
 
 
 
 The previous chapter focuses on the reaction of state and national transportation 
agencies to a disaster through emergency operations planning.  This planning requires an 
understanding of the consequences of the loss of important sections of the transportation 
system on area recovery, which necessitates an examination of vulnerabilities.  The 
possibility of losing a transportation system component is an important factor in the 
consideration of transportation alternatives for emergency response and aid personnel, 
and may be preventable through proper foresight.  This chapter discusses one common 
method for determining the most vulnerable and critical assets within the transportation 
system as compiled by AASHTO.     
 
4.1 Vulnerability Analysis 
In response to the heightened state of awareness to transportation security 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, NCHRP funded the development 
of a resource for highway vulnerability assessment for use by state DOTs.  A Guide to 
Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection, 
produced in 2002, was intended to assist state DOTs in improving their security planning 
against terrorism by outlining a procedure for assessing the vulnerability of a wide range 
of physical assets to terrorist threats, developing countermeasures to those threats, and 
estimating the capital and operating costs of those countermeasures (11).   
The guide was intended for use by any state DOT and applicable at all levels of 
DOT staff, from the executives initiating the assessment process to the employees 
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conducting the assessment.  The authors also intended for it to be useful to states already 
performing vulnerability assessments by offering the guide for comparison against 
current plans, allowing a state DOT to either validate an existing approach or bring it up 
to the standard proposed in the guide.  For states in the early stages of developing an 
assessment process, the guide references other states’ performances of the outlined 
procedures, providing descriptions of how other states apply these principles as well as 
issues and challenges newcomers should be prepared to face. 
The guide assembles the vulnerability assessment process into three major phases: 
I. Pre-Assessment - this phase involves planning and scheduling the 
vulnerability assessment process.  An assessment team is assembled and led 
through training exercises to prepare for the assessment.  Any resources 
necessary for the assessment are collected and external agencies with 
security or emergency response knowledge and capabilities, such as law 
enforcement or fire services, are contacted for support. 
II. Assessment – in this phase, the vulnerability assessment of the system is 
performed. This process involves determining the criticality and 
vulnerability of particular components, leading to the identification of key 
components requiring further countermeasures to ensure their continued 
functioning during, or quick recovery from, a disaster. 
III. Post-Assessment – once the assessment has been completed, cost-benefit 
analyses and trade-off studies can be used to determine a strategy for 
implementing the recommended countermeasures. 
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During the process of assembling a team for the vulnerability assessment, the guide 
suggests that members be recruited from different sections of the DOT.  This will include 
departments with obvious assessment-related experience such as the construction 
division, design division, materials testing division, traffic operations division, and 
environmental management division, but should also include departments such as budget, 
purchasing, communications, and human resources among others.  This provides a varied 
perspective on the criticality as well as the vulnerability of each section of infrastructure 
beyond physical measures. It also means early involvement of important personnel who 
may be critical to assessing the viability of countermeasures, which can increase the 
speed and efficiency of decision making.  
 The major portion of this guide is devoted to an explanation of the vulnerability 
assessment process.  Although the guide was written specifically for terrorist incidents, 
the process can be broadened to include natural disaster preparedness, since the ultimate 
goal is to prepare for and respond to a disruption in the transportation system.  
Preparation for terrorist incidents is hampered by their inherent unpredictability in terms 
of when, where and how a terrorist will act.  The intent of the vulnerability assessment 
process is to determine the where and how by identifying potential targets within the 
transportation system and determining what is required to disable those targets, leaving 
the “when” to law enforcement agencies or security authorities (12).  Non-terrorist 
incidents may alleviate some of this uncertainty through a modicum of predictability 
(such as tracking hurricanes during hurricane season or monitoring nuclear reactors) and 
a level of understanding through methodical examination of previous incidents.  
However, all incidents have the potential to cause damage to the transportation system, 
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regardless of the ways or extent to which the damage occurs.  With this in mind, the 
vulnerability assessment process should account for both terrorist and non-terrorist 
threats in the process of evaluating the vulnerability factors.  
 The following six subsections follow the outline for phase II of a vulnerability 
assessment process as described in A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for 
Critical Asset Identification and Protection (referred to as the guide), though each 
subsection may include a discussion of relevant issues or input for the process from other 
sources as noted.  The process is guided by three basic goals: determining the likelihood 
that an incident will occur as well as the components likely to be affected, assessing the 
system and determining the amount of damage that may be caused, and then assessing the 
impacts of a component failure and the possible countermeasures to that failure.  The 
process is intended to be iterative, acknowledging that assessment results—as well as 
new information—change risks, and therefore require periodic updating (12). 
 
4.2 Critical Asset Identification 
 The assessment process begins with an identification of the assets that are critical 
to maintaining the essential functions of the DOT.  The guide divides these assets into 
four categories: infrastructure, such as roads or bridges; physical facilities, such as 
headquarters buildings or traffic operations centers; equipment, such as variable 
messaging systems or traffic signals; and employees, which includes non-government 
employees such as contractors and vendors.  Criteria for establishing the criticality of the 
asset must be determined by the DOT, and each of these criteria must be given a weight 
to prioritize it among the other criteria.  This does not mean that one criterion must 
outweigh another, which would indicate that the criteria are ranked; instead, the degree to 
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which the criterion influences labeling an asset as critical determines the weight it is 
given, meaning that multiple criteria could have the same influence and therefore the 
same weight.  For instance, the risk of casualties and importance to emergency response 
capabilities are two criteria that could be weighted the same as they are both severe 
consequences of an incident.  The guide suggests assigning weights ranging from 5 
(extremely important) to 1 (less important).  
Asset redundancy is an example of one criterion that can be used to establish 
criticality because some components such as bridges and rail lines are usually one of only 
a few options for their purpose (13).  Redundancy can also include personnel, which 
ensures that particular functions and responsibilities are carried out if particular personnel 
are lost or unable to carry out their duties, and the equipment needed to carry out the 
functions of the DOT during and after and emergency.  Facility redundancy was a major 
issue during the 9/11 terrorist attacks because the Emergency Operations Center, with all 
of the emergency protocol documents, was located in the World Trade Center.  After this 
building was destroyed, those involved in the response and recovery effort had to rely on 
training in order to carry out any plan because they did not have any guidelines (10). 
 Once the criteria have been weighted, every asset is assessed for every factor on a 
“yes” or “no” basis (either the asset does or does not meet the criteria).  In this manner, 
each asset that meets the particular criterion is given the same weighted value for that 
criterion, regardless of the extent to which the criterion applies.  For instance, if factor 
“A” weighted at a value of 4 applies to a particular asset, that asset receives a 4; if it does 
not, then that asset receives a 0.  This is an attempt to mitigate subjectivity in the 
determination of asset criticality.  The subjectivity lies in the designation of weight for 
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the criterion, which should be agreed upon by knowledgeable professionals.  Once the 
weight is established, it does not vary for each asset; either the criterion applies and it 
receives the corresponding weight, or it does not.  For instance, the casualty risk is given 
a particular weight, and this weight applies whether one life may be lost or one thousand.  
The asset itself is not given a value based on the extent to which lives may be lost, which 
could be different than another asset, assuring consistency among assessments for all of 
the assets.  
 Certain factors may only apply to assets to a certain degree, and therefore the 
guide does suggest introducing a gradient for a particular criterion by splitting the 
criterion into moderate, major, etc.  For instance, a state may decide that a moderate 
economic impact as a result of the loss of an asset may be easier to contain or rebound 
from than a major impact, which should be reflected in the prioritization of assets.  The 
DOT needs to differentiate between a major economic consequence and a moderate 
economic consequence, and can do so by introducing both factors and weighing them 
according to the DOT’s perception of severity.  However, the guide warns that the 
introduction of gradients may complicate the process by increasing the number of 
judgments required during the assessment.  
 Once each asset has been assessed, the criticality weights are tallied for each 
asset, and, according to the guide, are divided by the total possible weight.  The projects 
are then ranked by percentage.  Some DOT’s may define a particular cutoff point at 
which no further consideration will be given to the asset, in order to reduce the number of 
assets that will be considered over the entire process, which reduces time and cost.  At the 
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end of this process, the DOT may have a table similar to Table 1 below, which was taken 
from a hypothetical example in the guide. 
 
Table 1: Example criticality scoring table  
 
 
Source: A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection 
 
 In this table, the assets are listed on the left.  The criteria developed by the 
assessment team are listed across the top according to their corresponding alphabetical 
designation.  For instance, in this table “A” corresponds to “Ability to Provide 
Protection,” “B” corresponds to “Relative Vulnerability to Attack,” “C” corresponds to 
Casualty Risk,” “D” corresponds to “Environmental Impact,” “E” corresponds to 
“Replacement Cost,” etc..  Although these factors are used here for example purposes 
only, the full list of factor values is given in Appendix C.  Below the criteria are the 
corresponding weights determined by the assessment team.  Note that within their 
respective row, each asset either receives the weighted score if they meet the criteria, or 
receives a “0” if they do not.  These weights are then summed to a total score on the right 
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and used to rank the projects.  The more factors that are associated with a particular 
project, the higher the total score will be.  At this point, the assessment team can decide 
to eliminate projects that do not meet a certain threshold based on their expertise with the 
assets and knowledge of DOT needs (11).  The total score will be combined later with the 
vulnerability assessment to prioritize projects for countermeasure application. 
4.2.1 Criticality assessment issues 
 
 Different assets represent varying levels of criticality, and the criticality 
assessment step is an attempt to quantify those differences.  However, applying these 
weights in a binary fashion may not provide a complete picture of criticality issues.  The 
guide does mention using a gradient when one factor does not fully represent the level of 
variation possible with the factor (such as varying levels of economic impact), but a 
different option (similar to the process of evaluating vulnerability, shown in the next 
section) involves establishing the likelihood that each criterion will happen for each asset.  
Criticality is instead represented as a scale, and the values of each factor can be evaluated 
on that scale.  Using loss of human lives as an example factor, Table 2 represents possible 
scaled values, with 5 incurring the most loss and 0 representing no loss: 
 
Table 2: Example critical asset factor scale 
 
Critical Asset Factor Values Score 
Human Loss 
High loss (50 or more deaths) 5  
Moderate-High loss (20 – 49 deaths) 4 4 
Moderate loss (10 – 19 deaths) 3  
Low-Moderate loss (5 – 9 deaths) 2  
Low loss (1 – 4 deaths) 1  
Human loss unlikely (no deaths) 0  
Source: Author 
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Table 2 shows that this particular asset scored a value of 4 for the factor, which would 
then be combined with other factor values (evaluated the same way) for a total criticality 
score that more fully represents difference between critical transportation elements.  
 Another option would be to keep the weighted values for each factor, and in 
addition determine the probability of a particular transportation asset being affected by an 
event.  The assigned weight for the respective criterion is then multiplied by the 
determined probability value, and the adjusted criterion values are totaled for the asset.  
The criticality factor retains the same weight determined at the beginning of the process, 
meaning the relative importance of that factor to the DOT is maintained throughout the 
process; but combining it with the probability of the factor occurring increases the 
accuracy of those weights in relation to other assets. 
 It is important that the process for determining a likelihood scale or probabilities 
is objective.  England’s Highways Agency uses a manual that provides probabilities 
associated with four factors involved in the calculation of risk of failure for highway 
structures: causes of failure, defects that may result in failure, degree of exposure to 
threats, and effect of these previous factors (14).  The agency determines the probabilities 
for various conditions based on historical data before issuing look-up tables for reference 
when a particular asset is being evaluated.  Multiple components within each factor are 
considered in the establishment of the factor’s probability, which is then applied to the 
following equation:   
L(Risk Event) = L(Cause) x L(Defect) x L(Exposure) x L(Effect) 
        Where L = Likelihood 
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Combining these four factors results in a value representing the likelihood of a risk event 
occurring based on pre-determined probabilities, which is then evaluated within a range 
of 0 (possible, but not likely) to 1 (certain). 
 If a manual is not available, another option is to use the Delphi method of 
consensus building.  The Delphi method incorporates personnel with expertise related to 
the established criteria from the DOT as well as relevant agencies, including law 
enforcement and emergency response.  The carefully selected panel is involved in an 
iterative group communication process, providing feedback through each individual’s 
anonymous contribution to particular problems.  During the process, each person is given 
a questionnaire, and the subsequent answers are displayed anonymously so that 
participants can either modify or retain their responses in light of the responses of the 
group.  Each questionnaire and subsequent collation of answers represents a round, and 
the process can go through multiple rounds until reaching a pre-determined zenith, such 
as a particular number of rounds or a convergence of responses (15).  However, the 
Delphi method does not guarantee a consensus for each subject because strong opinions 
may tend to polarize during the process, though this polarization does mean that points of 
contention can be highlighted and brought out into open discussion (16).  The key 
benefits of this process include the removal of the negative effects of confrontation or 
group dynamics in decision making, the inclusion of constant feedback that contributes to 
the ability of a participant to reevaluate their opinion, and the degree of anonymity that 
allows participants to both freely critique other’s judgments and openly admit to errors in 
their own judgment.  This process is not without its “pitfalls,” such as the possibility of 
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using false feedback to manipulate participants, or inducing a false consensus by ignoring 
or downplaying disagreements (17).   
 
4.3 Vulnerability Assessment 
 After identifying critical assets, a vulnerability assessment is performed on those 
assets in order to determine the possibility and extent to which each asset could be 
damaged during an incident.  The assessment also considers the harm that may come to 
users of those assets—such as transit passengers, drivers or employees—as well as 
damage to any element involved in monitoring and managing the operation of the system.  
 The process begins with a determination of the threats to the asset.  These threats 
may be natural, such as tornadoes, earthquakes, or floods.  Generally, these conditions are 
known to the region and the asset’s designers, and the assets are built to resist these 
natural occurrences.  Acts of terrorism are more unpredictable than natural incidents in 
terms of determining when they will happen (a lack of previous threats or actions does 
not guarantee safety for the future), though the specific targets may be easier to predict 
given that terrorists generally have reasons for choosing those targets.  Because terrorist 
incidents generally require additional considerations and are usually accounted for in a 
separate annex to security plans, they are discussed later in this section.  
Vulnerability can be linked to several factors.  One factor is the structural stability 
of the physical components of the system, including roads, railways, bridges and 
buildings.  Structural stability is a straightforward factor to assess because the DOT 
should already possess knowledge of the materials and structural elements used in the 
design of the particular asset.  Structural information is also static information, meaning 
that the elements of the structure usually do not change.  Although materials do 
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deteriorate and structures can deform over time, these characteristics can be accounted 
for and factored into the vulnerability assessment.  However, it is important to note that 
data may be collected from multiple sources, depending on the asset.  This can lead to 
compatibility issues between data sets, resulting in extra time needed to link the data 
together in order to provide useful results.  This provides an opportunity for state DOTs 
to intervene as system regulators and process implementers by organizing and ensuring 
the consistent use of an effective data format that can be easily transferred among 
agencies, reducing time and confusion (12, 18). 
The availability of response resources is highly important in the consideration of 
the vulnerability of an asset, in terms of both the initial response to the incident and the 
subsequent recovery.  The fast and efficient response to a disaster by emergency 
personnel can determine the number of lives saved or lost, which, as discussed earlier, 
can affect the number of personnel available for a recovery effort if a significant DOT 
facility is attacked or destroyed.  This response effort is influenced by the number of 
resources available, as well as the quality and type of resources, which is true of both the 
emergency responders and the DOT personnel.  This relates to the concept of redundancy 
in that the more personnel available, the less likely that all of them will be lost in a major 
catastrophe.  Also, more highly trained personnel will be able to more quickly react to an 
incident, increasing the probability of a successful recovery from an incident.  The 
relative location of critical assets to emergency responders, as well as the distance from 
facilities (both DOT and private) that are influential to recovery efforts is another 
important consideration.  No matter how many or how effective emergency response 
personnel are, if they are a great distance from an important asset it will be more difficult 
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for them to respond quickly to the incident.  Likewise, the time required to replace or 
restore an asset is influenced by the time it takes to get the necessary equipment and 
materials to the site. 
Terrorist activities involve additional vulnerability considerations that are exemplified 
by the separate terrorist annexes typically found in emergency response plans.  The 
annexes are also characterized by the addition of particular law enforcement agents 
among the list of cooperating agencies, as well as the need for additional countermeasure 
techniques for preventing attacks, such as biometrics or crime prevention through 
environmental design (CPTED) (7).  Planning for terrorist incidents generally involves a 
consideration of the amount of effort required to disable or destroy a target.  One factor in 
this is the accessibility of the asset, which is a major consideration for transit systems due 
to their inherent openness. Another is the aforementioned structural stability, because 
knowledge of the materials and design of the structure influences the understanding of 
the ways and means to destroy it.  The amount of security, surveillance, or other attack 
deterrents at the asset also influences the requirements for a successful attack.  Other 
factors that influence terrorist incident planning include the symbolic importance of the 
asset, of which the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are examples; 
and the frequency and volume of users, of which the 1995 Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo 
subway and the 2004 Madrid train bombings are examples. 
 Once the factors associated with vulnerability have been established, values for 
those factors must be determined in order to compare them with the criticality factors; 
however, this process does not involve the same weighting process performed in the 
criticality assessment.  The AASHTO guide (which only considers terrorist incidents in 
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its account of the vulnerability assessment process) proposes assigning values ranging 
from “extremely important” (5) to “less important” (1) for paired subsets of vulnerability 
factors.  For instance, the proximity of vehicle access points is paired with the level of 
security at the asset because both characteristics are part of the overall accessibility of the 
asset.  Values ranging from 1 to 5 are assigned by the assessment team for each of the two 
sub-factors of accessibility (proximity and security level), and then multiplied together to get 
the respective factor value.  The overall vulnerability value is then determined as the sum of 
each of the vulnerability factor values, which can be seen below in Table 3, taken from a 
hypothetical example in the guide.  Table 3 shows how factors such as access proximity 
(labeled as “C”) and level of security (labeled as “D”) are combined, then added to other 
paired factors for each asset.  A full list of these example factors is given in Appendix D.  
The sum of these combinations gives the total vulnerability score on the right. 
 
Table 3: Example vulnerability scoring table  
 
 
Source: A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection 
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4.3.1 Vulnerability Assessment Issues 
 
One issue in this step of the process is that sub-factors that should be considered 
individually are combined with other related, but possibly distinct factors, 
overemphasizing their interdependence as well as equalizing their severity.  For instance, 
in determining the vulnerability of an asset to a terrorist attack, the number of users for an 
asset is combined with the level of visibility.  Assets with high visibility and a large 
number of users are considered more vulnerable than less visible assets with few users, a 
plausible perspective with respect to terrorism.  However, either factor could 
independently be a strong reason for a terrorist attack, given that terrorists have different 
agendas.  The terrorist attack may utilize a recognized target or a large number of 
casualties to incite terror, and combining these two factors may reduce their significance.  
As an example, assume we are evaluating two sites (A and B) based on the AASHTO 
guide, one with a high level of recognition/low attendance and one with medium 
recognition/medium attendance.  Using Table 4 below, site A would receive two separate 
values, a 5 and a 1, and site B would receive a 3 and a 3.  Table 4 is taken from a 
hypothetical example in the guide. 
 
Table 4: Factor values for Recognition and Attendance  
 
Source: A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection 
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In this example, because combined values are multiplied together, site A receives a 
factor value of 5 (5 x 1) while site B receives the higher value of 9 (3 x 3).  Although site A 
may be a more desirable target due to its high visibility (similar to the Eiffel tower or 
Washington monument), Site B, with lower visibility and a moderate possibility of casualties, 
receives a value almost double that of site A.  Now consider using these same default values, 
but adding them rather than multiplying them, and the two sites would be equal (5+1 and 
3+3).  This seems a more appropriate comparison of the desirability of these two targets.  In 
essence, combining factor values can either add unnecessary emphasis on or reduce the 
appropriate valuation of a particular factor. 
  
4.4 Consequence Assessment 
 At this point in the assessment, the critical assets have been identified and their 
respective level of vulnerability has been determined.  However, not every critical asset 
will have the same level of vulnerability, and those that are more vulnerable will require 
more consideration.  The purpose of the consequence assessment is to determine the most 
vulnerable assets reaching a predetermined threshold.  This is accomplished by plotting 
the criticality of the asset against its vulnerability. 
 Using the method prescribed in the guide, the criticality and vulnerability values 
determined earlier in the assessment process are normalized by their respective maximum 
values: 
Normalized criticality of asset n = Xn = (Cn /Cmax)*100  
Normalized vulnerability of asset n = Yn = (Vn/Vmax)*100 
The base values now represent percentages of the maximum possible criticality or 
vulnerability.  Representing these values as percentages reflects the effort in determining 
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the factors for criticality and vulnerability; because the individual factors have already 
been imbued with a level of severity or influence during their formulation, Xn and Yn 
represent the extent to which each asset is critical or vulnerable respectively.  Also, by 
normalizing vulnerability and criticality they are placed on a scale of 0 to 100 by which 
they can be compared. 
 The comparison of the two values is usually represented in a plot of the X and Y 
values for each asset, which is shown on the next page in a plot taken from the guide 
(Figure 2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection 
 
Figure 2: Vulnerability versus criticality and the four quadrants of consequence. 
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 Plotting the value provides a visual representation of the ranking of one project 
against another.  According to this figure, any asset with X and Y values of 50 or higher 
is of greater consequence to the DOT than projects falling into any of the other quadrants, 
and therefore requires countermeasures to mitigate the impacts of an incident.  The level 
at which these quadrants are set can be determined by the DOT prior to the assessment in 
order to meet with DOT goals in terms of fortifying critical assets or reducing 
vulnerability.  This does not mean that assets falling into other quadrants do not require 
attention; the process is simply meant to provide a means by which different assets can be 
compared.   
 
4.5 Countermeasures 
 Once priority assets have been determined in the consequence assessment, 
countermeasures to the possible incidents need to be proposed and evaluated.  This is a 
crucial step in the assessment process because all prior efforts to determine the 
vulnerability of critical parts of the transportation system are wasted if an attempt to 
improve the system is not made.  However, this may also prove to be the most difficult 
step in the process.  The difficulty at this juncture is a result of the fact that developing 
countermeasures can be an involved and complex process, considering that most 
approaches involve a layered system of detection, defense and response.  Applying a 
layered response means that each component is dependent on the other two, so success 
depends on the proper development and application of all three.  These three components 
are often performed in cooperation with external agencies, which adds to the complexity 
by requiring the coordination of joint efforts.  Further aggravating the issue is the fact that 
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countermeasures require funding, and the choice to pursue a particular countermeasure 
will most likely mean sacrifices in other transportation projects.   
 DOT involvement in the security planning process does not end at the beginning 
of countermeasure selection; yet for external agencies involved in security 
countermeasures such as anti-terrorism task forces or earth-quake monitoring stations, the 
transportation system may not be its primary security concern as it would be for a state 
DOT.  Their focus may involve only one of the three components, detecting, defending, 
or responding to the event.  Local transportation agencies’ focus may only be concerned 
with threats in particular areas or on particular modes.  To ensure the security of the 
transportation system, the coordination of relevant parties will most likely fall to the state 
DOT.  This is an important role because the different responsibilities will require outside 
input for success.  For instance, emergency responders need route information to 
determine the best possible choice—as well as the best alternative in the event the route 
is lost—for getting to the scene of a disaster quickly.  Likewise, terrorist information 
from law enforcement agencies or weather information from reporting agencies is crucial 
to determine those assets that are more likely to be damaged. 
 Funding is another crucial issue that will require a champion.  Security-related 
personnel or technologies will not be provided out of good will, and local agencies such 
as MPOs or transit agencies generally look to state DOTs for funding.  State DOTs 
possess more resources for acquiring funds than local agencies (though it is not an easy 
task), and have an established relationship with the federal government that provides a 
platform to lobby for increased security funding.  However, obtaining this funding is not 
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a simple or reliable process.  The issues associated with gaining the necessary funds, as 
well as other issues involved in security planning, are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5:  
Issues in Transportation Security Planning 
 
 
 
The vulnerability assessment process is crucial to enhancing the security of the 
transportation system, and it is a large but necessary responsibility of the state DOT.  But 
the process has several problems, including data compatibility issues, problems 
associated with the prescribed methods of weighting factors, and issues with subjectivity 
influencing the process.  The final countermeasure selection step is the most significant 
part of the vulnerability assessment process because it is the application of the knowledge 
acquired from assessing the infrastructure.  This step also raises issues, and the problems 
associated with it hinder the effectiveness of other parts of the process.  Highlighting 
these issues sheds light on areas where state DOTs can assume stronger roles in ensuring 
the security of the transportation system.   
Using published reports on security planning issues as well as interviews with 
DOT personnel, this chapter reviews some common issues with the vulnerability 
assessment process.  California, New York, Virginia, Maryland, North Dakota, Florida 
and Ohio were selected for use in this analysis based on factors such as relative exposure 
to natural or man-made threats, availability of planning information and complexity of 
the planning environment.  For example, California presents a complex planning 
environment due to characteristics the multiple types of hazards that can occur across the 
expanse of the state; whereas Maryland presents a contrasting planning environment that 
focuses on fewer issues.  The interview questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.  
Although multiple personnel were interviewed for this thesis, interviews are not 
specifically referenced in this section for two reasons: first, some information provided 
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was used for analysis purposes in this thesis, but was not intended for public 
dissemination; and second, most respondents reiterated issues found in literature used in 
this thesis, so the literature is primary used as the source and cited here. 
 
5.1 Funding 
 Implementing countermeasures to natural and man-made disasters is one of the 
most important steps in the vulnerability assessment process.  Gathering important 
information on structural vulnerability or possible terrorist threats to particular transit 
systems means very little if that information is not used to protect transportation assets 
and their users.  As Chapter 4 showed, there are various types of countermeasures, from 
infrastructure development, to technological enhancements, to increases in personnel; 
however, one common thread among these measures is that none of them are free.  State 
DOTs play a large and important role in assessing and planning for the vulnerabilities of 
their transportation systems, but they can do very little about those vulnerabilities without 
sufficient funds.  One of the most important roles state DOTs can assume in the overall 
security planning process is as a financier.  This role may mean securing and providing 
funds dedicated to security measures through in-state legislative measures or new funding 
mechanisms, just as many states have become more creative in securing funds for their 
general projects when faced with a budget crisis due to factors such as the decrease in 
gasoline tax revenue.  This role may also involve serving as the spokesperson to the 
federal government in attempting to secure more dedicated funding for transportation 
security projects, considering that local funding may not be sufficient. 
The events of 9/11 brought transportation security into the forefront of national 
policy and local concern, and the subsequent attempts to increase the amount of security 
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planning and practice to prevent terrorism provide multiple examples of the funding 
issues DOTs face in trying to implement security strategies.  In a 2003 report on the post-
9/11 efforts to enhance the security of highways and transit systems, Howitt and Makler 
found that although the aviation sector had greatly improved its security measures as a 
result of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, “surface transportation has been 
effectively placed in a secondary tier of public services in terms of protective actions” 
(2). Although most would agree that highways and transit systems are vulnerable to 
attack, even the heightened state of security awareness following 9/11 could not 
guarantee dedicated security funding to support terrorist countermeasures for surface 
transportation.  Instead, funding was focused on four aspects of security planning and 
emergency response: airline security, intelligence/law enforcement, emergency medical 
and public health infrastructure, and emergency response personnel training.   
Each of these factors is an important consideration in security planning and 
recovery, and it is expected that they would be the focus after an event such as 9/11.  
Health infrastructure and response personnel training both represent a focus on the 
aftermath portion of security planning.  These factors come into play once a disaster has 
happened and the focus is shifted to recovering from the disaster and mitigating the loss 
of human lives.  It is a very important consideration in the planning process because no 
plan is guaranteed to work completely.  Intelligence gathering and law enforcement 
services are an integral part of the initial planning spectrum because they provide the 
information concerning an impending disaster (in this case a terrorist attack) as well as 
serving the important role of deterring or capturing those responsible.  Any authority 
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would likely enhance the focus on intelligence and law enforcement given this event to 
both prevent another attack and catch the terrorists.   
The focus on airline security is also a likely response to terrorism because it is 
now necessary to both ensure that the event does not happen again and assure passengers 
that it is safe to fly to keep the system functional.  This initial attention is a natural 
reaction, yet it essentially places the entire burden of transportation security on one 
component of the system.  Providing money for intelligence gathering or emergency 
response personnel supports all aspects of disaster planning and response.  Yet the post-
9/11 funding initiatives focused only on one possible way terrorists could use the system 
to their advantage.  If a terrorist intends to do harm in an open or broad manner, the 
multiple reasons the transportation system is a good target have already been discussed; 
and as a system, there are multiple components that can be exploited.  Although initially 
focusing on airlines is an appropriate response given the environment, successive funding 
opportunities should enhance the ability to secure the whole system rather than a single 
part. 
Initial efforts to increase the amount of funding available for transportation 
security have fallen short (2).  Several post-9/11 bills passed by Congress, such as the 
USA Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act, provide general-purpose grants to states for 
security functions, but do not provide dedicated funding, forcing security needs to 
compete for the same funding as traditional projects.  Because many states initially 
perceived that the federal government would or should provide dedicated homeland 
security funds for transportation security, they were often reluctant to tap into general 
purpose transportation funds for something that may be perceived as a security 
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enhancement, despite the heightened emphasis on security after 9/11. However, 
providing federal general purpose homeland security funds further complicated the issue 
when other agencies such as intelligence agencies, first responders or public health 
agencies, who were seen as traditional users of these types of funds, established 
competitive claims for the same funds transportation agencies were seeking (2).  The 
early stages of funding for security planning can therefore be characterized as a catch-22, 
with transportation agencies reluctant to dip into transportation funds, which inhibits the 
ability to complete other traditional projects, but unable to compete for dedicated security 
funds.   
 Although the Transportation Security Administration is responsible for the 
security of U.S. highways, railroads, buses, mass transit systems, pipelines, ports, and 
450 U.S. airports, only 1% of the $6.8 billion budget proposed under the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Bill (S. 3181) was devoted to surface transportation 
security.  This equates to $47 million, while aviation security received $4.8 billion, or 
71% of the budget.  Of this $47 million, only a portion goes to implementing specific 
countermeasures as a part of the overall security environment, including vulnerability 
assessments, information sharing resources, and security exercises.  This asymmetry is 
not specific to the TSA, but is instead a broader symptom of the funding problem.  In a 
2002 General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of 155 transit systems concerning federal 
involvement in transit security planning, increased funding was cited as the most 
important role the federal government could play in assisting transit systems with security 
planning (19).  But simply providing dedicated security funding is not a clear-cut 
solution.  Among the principle findings of a 2005 Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) 
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report on transit security in the U.S., the MTI found that although the threat to transit 
systems is usually aimed at systems in the largest and most politically and economically 
influential cities, this is at odds with “a political system of public finance that favors 
distributing funding somewhat equally across jurisdictions” (20).  The authors conclude 
that rather than focusing on the most critical (and therefore most likely to be targeted) 
systems, Congress will continue to distribute funds “equally” in a manner representative 
of the ethos of public finance and jurisdictional accountability.  Although this system 
may simply seem unfair when per-rider transit subsidies are much higher in smaller cities 
than transit-heavy cities like New York or San Francisco, it becomes a travesty when it 
undermines the effective implementation of security plans in vulnerable systems. 
It seems apparent that state DOTs cannot currently rely specifically on federal 
funding to support their security plans; and although events such as the world trade center 
terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina bring national attention to problem areas in 
security planning, it does not necessarily bring immediate solutions.  Instead, DOTs must 
assume a more proactive role in terms of both procuring the federal funds that are 
available—just as they do with federal sources for traditional transportation projects—
and developing new sources of revenue.  The introduction of security as a separate 
planning factor through SAFETEA-LU guidelines may mean that countermeasures will 
be incorporated as integral parts of transportation improvement programs, so that security 
features are integrated into new construction.  Countermeasures could also be funded 
through user fees similar to congestion or distance-based pricing, given that users may be 
more inclined to pay for their safety and security over the ability to save time during their 
commute (a charge many have become used to from airline travel). Regardless of the 
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means, it is clear that state DOTs must lead the effort to procure financing for security 
countermeasures, or else mandated security planning efforts could be fruitless without 
money to implement them.   
 
5.2 Coordination 
 Security planning is an extensive process involving the coordination of multiple 
departments within a DOT as well as external agencies.  As the owner and operator of the 
largest portions of state transportation systems, state DOTs have a vested interest in 
ensuring the safety and security of transportation infrastructure that extends beyond 
simple responsibility.  To do this, DOTs cannot act alone; they need transportation data 
from local agencies in conjunction with their own, and they need information specific to 
law enforcement agencies to better understand threats against their systems.  In 
collaboration with these various interests, the DOT needs to maintain a balance between 
security and mobility.  Law enforcement agencies may tend to stress the importance of 
deterring threats and keeping the system safe, and no DOT would want to see the 
destruction of a subway, highway, or airport; but too many restrictions can affect the 
ability to keep the system moving and effectively transporting people and goods.  This is 
the inherent problem in transportation security planning, and it represents the fact that 
different agencies represent different perspectives on appropriate strategies.  State DOTs 
have the greatest interest in keeping the system as a whole securely running, and 
subsequently must play the largest role in coordinating the various interests while 
maintaining efficient and effective collaboration. 
 In a 2006 UCLA study on security planning in U.S. transit agencies, Taylor et al 
reviewed 113 providers and found that 46% of transit agencies with rail have conducted 
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vulnerability assessments, as opposed to 13% of those without rail (21).  This difference 
is attributed by the authors to the perception by transit agency managers that rail is highly 
vulnerable to terrorist attack, though it is important to note that agencies with rail systems 
tend to be larger agencies with more resources to conduct an assessment.  However, the 
authors point out that some facilities without rail do have large, enclosed bus facilities 
that may be no less tempting a target from a terrorist’s perspective, but are not gaining 
the vulnerability assessment attention simply because they are not part of a rail system.  
Rail systems are not attacked because they are rail systems; they are attacked because of 
qualities such as their openness, large population of riders and high visibility that meet 
the goals of a terrorist action.  This misperception may arise from a misunderstanding of 
how terrorists operate, which is influenced by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  
Better communication between the agencies that evaluate terrorist characteristics and 
transportation agencies could solve an issue such as this by clarifying the intentions and 
targets of terrorist groups, allowing the agency to better perform its vulnerability 
assessment with an advanced knowledge of credible threats.   
Coordination between transit agencies and agencies that can provide the necessary 
terrorist information seems to be a persistent issue, according to two post-9/11 GAO 
reports (19, 22).  State DOTs may have more opportunities to come into contact with 
these agencies than smaller, regionally or modally focused agencies, and therefore can 
assume a larger role in coordinating information sharing.  The multiple interests involved 
in terrorism preparedness for the system as a whole—including federal sources such as 
Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (ATTF) and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) that may be 
supported by state resources—could be overwhelming for smaller agencies within the 
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state to attempt to maintain cooperative relationships with.  The complexity of 
coordinating transportation agencies with these groups—which can include simply 
determining who the representative should be or when a meeting is taking place—
coupled with the fact that appropriate information may come from multiple sources 
indicates that coordination would be better handled by an umbrella agency like the state 
DOT, which can devote attention to maintaining connections that might extend across 
state boundaries and up to the federal government.  Placing coordination efforts in the 
hands of the state DOT also maintains a system-wide focus on security issues; regional or 
local agencies may only be concerned with their particular asset, and therefore may not 
locate information outside of their area. 
 Three specific coordination issues were highlighted in a 2007 FHWA report on 
common issues in emergency preparedness and response: lack of understanding and 
experience with the Incident Command System (ICS), interagency difficulties with 
agency specific terms or acronyms, and the incompatibility of communication equipment 
(23).  Although ICS is incorporated into many DOT Emergency Response Plans (as 
previously discussed), this does not mean that every person on the DOT staff has had ICS 
training.  Whereas law enforcement and first responders will most likely have more 
experience with this system as it is integral to their work, and not every incident will 
require the involvement of the DOT.  The responsibility falls on the DOT to ensure that 
essential personnel are properly trained to follow the ICS system in the event of a disaster 
because a lack of understanding could slow response efforts and lead to a loss of life.  
 This training may also include an introduction to terms specific to either agency.  
Agencies may have particular language or terms natural to that specific agency but 
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uncommon for other agencies, and in order to work together there should be some 
assurance that agencies speak the same language.  Because DOT involvement may not 
always be as extensive as emergency response or law enforcement agencies, the DOT 
should be more proactive in merging the language of its various subsidiaries and gaining 
and disseminating the knowledge of other agencies it will need to communicate with.  
Emergency responders and law enforcement agencies generally communicate on a 
common platform (although federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
can be independent), but transit agencies are not always part of this network.  This is 
another area where the DOT needs to be proactive in assuring coordination for the sake 
of efficient communication.  As the owner and operator of its internal communication 
system, it is up to the DOT to ensure that this system can be used in the event of an 
emergency to communicate with other agencies that may need their support.  Emergency 
operations plans and training are not effective if directions and information cannot be 
communicated between the parties involved in the response effort. 
 Another coordination issue raised by this report concerns emergency evacuation 
routes and the lack of coordinated planning.  Evacuations may require movement across 
local, regional and state boundaries, and proper planning helps to ensure efficiency.  
According to this report, many routes are planned at the local level but are not placed into 
a regional context, while some regions have not formulated plans (23).  Mismatched or 
missing plans could lead to coordination issues between areas and their respective routes, 
and these issues will be easier to solve before rather than during an incident.  The federal 
government provides evacuation assistance to state and local governments for them to 
establish and maintain evacuation plans; but as a 2007 GAO report found, gaps in 
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requirements to “plan, train and conduct exercises” for evacuation routes can leave the 
financial assistance ineffective (4).  This problem highlights the issue of coordination for 
state DOTs, offering an opportunity to play a large role in assuring regional coordination 
where local interests may cause division, as well as maintaining accountability where the 
federal government cannot.  
 Vulnerability assessments are the core of security planning, yet this same report 
shows that, although many transportation agencies have performed “at least a cursory 
assessment,” the lack of coordination is devaluing those assessments (23).  A lack of 
coordination with other local agencies or jurisdictions resulted in multiple lists of critical 
and vulnerable infrastructure being developed for the same community, wasting time and 
money.  Many agencies are not identifying methods for monitoring or securing critical 
infrastructure once they are identified. Some assessments were not performed in 
conjunction with a law enforcement agency or not shared with those agencies, although 
the report shows that few coordinated efforts exist to communicate the results among 
relevant agencies.  This report highlights a serious deficiency among transportation 
agencies, and an opportunity to resolve an issue that the aforementioned evidence 
suggests will not resolve itself. 
 
5.3 Standardization  
 Increasing the coordination among transportation agencies and external agencies 
will also highlight disparities in methods and standards in security planning procedures.  
An increase in the interaction between agencies could also provide the opportunity to 
evaluate the benefits and costs of these variations in order to determine the best approach 
to emergency preparedness.  It may also serve to inform various agencies of these 
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standards so that each agency is aware of this standardization, leading to an 
understanding of the differences or similarities in each agency’s practices prior to the 
event of an emergency.  
 The TSA has placed a large amount of effort into standardizing aviation security 
practices, though other modes have not received the same amount of attention (20, 22). A 
lack of resources inhibits smaller transportation agencies from independently developing 
security standards, although independent developments could increase the confusion by 
increasing the variety of standards.  State DOTs however have the resources and the 
broad perspective to coordinate the standardization of security guidelines.  Although the 
role of the TSA in security regulations is increasing, there are multiple opportunities for 
state DOTs to take action.  These efforts could range from a focus on system users, such 
as standards for transit system exit signs or the content and structure of hazard warning 
systems, to a focus on the system personnel through training standards.  The 
infrastructure and vehicles that make up the system would also benefit through such 
efforts as design standards or operational regulations, such as minimum parking distances 
to important buildings or restricted parking near bridges.  The planning process itself 
could also benefit through vulnerability assessment standards such as mandating the 
particular types of data sets to be used, which reduces the possibility of incompatible data 
sets. 
 State DOTs already serve as a standard making organization with respect to the 
normal operations of the transportation system, so security regulations would not be a 
new direction or stretch of resources for them.  They already have an interest in 
maintaining the system through vulnerability analysis and planning, so this seems a 
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natural extension of those responsibilities.  It is also in their best interest to ensure that 
smaller agencies under their guidance are following the same procedures so that there 
will be no confusion surrounding the security guidelines, which could cause serious 
problems if they are not uncovered until the event of an emergency.  The current relaxed 
state of federal regulations with regard to security planning— represented by the fact that 
the SAFETEA-LU mandate goes no further than saying that security must be independent 
of safety in the transportation plan—is not so much a void as it is an opportunity to 
establish the best practices for an individual state, which may not be the same across 
different regions of the country.  Establishing security guidelines based on an evaluation 
of known procedures give the state DOT the opportunity to both define their role in 
security planning and define their position of what is appropriate for their state.  
 
5.4 Communications Equipment Compatibility 
 Coordination and standardization issues culminate in problems associated with 
the incompatibility of communications equipment among agencies involved in disaster 
response.  The ability to communicate is vital to the functioning of any disaster response 
effort, especially for transportation officials who need to relay the conditions of the 
transportation network in order to ensure that response plans can be carried out 
effectively.  As mentioned in the previous discussion of COOP plans, the lack of 
redundancy in communications systems restricted communication between some of the 
people and agencies involved in the response to the 9/11 attacks.  It would seem that a 
nationally recognized disaster such as this would provide the impetus for reform, yet a 
2007 FHWA report on transportation emergency response showed that redundancy 
remained an issue six years later (23).   
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 Another issue is that many transportation agencies are not able to communicate on 
the same platform as first-responder agencies, leaving a gap in communications abilities.  
This is essentially a technology issue in which different agencies have communications 
devices of various caliber or age, which will ultimately require additional funding and 
investment to resolve.  Some smaller states are resolving the issue by updating their 
technology and placing everyone on the same platform, while some larger states are not 
(possibly due to the cost).  Putting every agency on the same platform does not 
necessarily resolve communications issues, but may rather increase the need to 
coordinate, plan and train personnel on the proper guidelines for usage (i.e. assigning 
radio frequencies for particular purposes).  Ensuring the ability to communicate does not 
necessarily mean that information will be conveyed effectively either.  Some larger states 
that experience more varied types of emergencies more frequently have opted to maintain 
their current communications systems and instead focus on ICS training, which gives 
personnel a better understanding of the leadership system and who they are reporting to 
during an emergency.   
 It seems that a balanced approach of communication ability and command 
structure is necessary for effective coordination during an emergency, which is a 
regulatory standpoint that the DOT will have to evaluate and enforce.  The technological 
deficiencies that hinder communication are generally on the side of the transportation 
agencies, since communication technology is more integral to law enforcement and first 
responder agencies.  Command system strategies are also generally more developed 
within these agencies, meaning that transportation agencies need to position themselves 
within these structures.  These tasks may require more resources than smaller agencies 
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can spare, and may require not only interstate coordination and cooperation but intrastate 
as well.  The DOT seems to be in the prime position for overcoming these impediments 
and establishing an effective communications strategy. 
 
5.5 Role of Intelligent Transportation System  
 ITS functions highlight the capabilities of state DOTS as transportation security 
information providers.   In addition to non-emergency uses, ITS applications such as 
variable message signs, highway advisory radio (HAR), surveillance cameras, and 
transportation management centers play an important role in the collection and 
dissemination of transportation system information, both for use in vulnerability analysis 
and in providing critical information to emergency agencies and system users (24).  Its 
importance is exemplified in SAFETEA-LU, Title V, Subtitle C—Intelligent 
Transportation System Research, Section 5303 (a)(5), which mandates ITS research to 
“[improve] the Nation’s ability to respond to security—related or other manmade 
emergencies and natural disasters,” although it only provides funding for “outreach, 
public relations, displays, tours, and brochures.”  The information provided by ITS 
technologies can be invaluable to system planners and other agencies that need this 
information to correctly assess the characteristics of the network.  Even more important is 
the ability of ITS technologies to assist in the evaluation of the post-disaster system and 
inform users of critical issues or available routes.   
 A 2007 FHWA report on common issues in emergency preparedness and 
response showed that some locales are not incorporating ITS capabilities into security 
planning, and some first-responder agencies are not aware of the capabilities of the 
system to aid in disaster response (23).  For instance, some locations utilize real-time 
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video surveillance, and therefore are not able to record the system for law enforcement 
use; in other instances, legislation prevents the use of this information by law 
enforcement agencies.  Although the variation in legal practices between states makes 
recommendations difficult, the situation still needs to be addressed (23).  Other issues are 
more technical in nature, such as terrain obstructions restricting HAR or cell phone 
updates.  
 Resolving issues such as these is a critical step for the DOT because 
transportation system information is its essential role in an emergency.  Outside of an 
emergency, this information is the key to establishing coordination among the different 
relevant agencies.  Emergency management agencies and law enforcement agencies may 
need this information to properly carry out their duties, and providing this information 
can establish important relationships that lead to effective communication between 
agency personnel.  Although other agencies such as EMAs or MPOs may have an interest 
in securing this information or ensuring its proper use, it is typically the DOT that owns 
and operates ITS equipment.  In contrast to the issues discussed previously, ITS issues 
represent a particular instance in which the DOT is the focal point for correcting the 
issue.  Although other agencies may have greater involvement in overall emergency 
planning or direct emergency response, ITS issues present a direct opportunity for DOTs 
to influence security planning issues. 
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Chapter 6:  
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 In his 2007 testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee 
on Homeland Security, the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, William O. 
Jenkins Jr., clearly conveyed the need for coordination among those involved in 
emergency planning and response: “In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from 
any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of 
authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, 
and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making” (4).  One 
respondent to an MTI security practice study conveyed this idea in a slightly more 
succinct manner: “...emergencies are not the time to meet your counterpart in different 
agencies” (20).  The role of coordinator is both an important and a difficult one. Chapter 
3 discussed the complexity of the security planning environment, which involves many 
stakeholders that smaller agencies may not have the resources to maintain contact with.  
The U.S. DOT, a larger entity with more varied resources, maintains a plan for 
coordinating state DOTs once a national emergency has been declared, but coordinating 
multiple local authorities could also over-extend the resources of federal agencies (not to 
mention encountering resistance).  For example, DHS grants to state and local 
governments for security efforts were not sufficiently kept track of, showing that 
decisions could be made but oversight could not be maintained (4).   
 The significant position state DOTs hold between federal agencies and local 
authorities is one that should not be squandered.  State DOTs have the resources and 
motivation to improve the collaboration and communication that establishes relationships 
60 
integral security planning.  Yet it is important that DOTs navigate the balance between 
being an authority and a resource. The DOTs role as a coordinator is to ensure that 
various agencies communicate so that each agency has the proper frame of reference and 
different efforts do not overlap or mismatch; their role is not to fill in any perceived gaps 
on the part of other agencies.  There is an important distinction between transportation 
personnel and emergency responders that should be maintained; otherwise the situation 
becomes what may be colloquially described as “the tail wagging the dog.”  The DOT 
ultimately serves a supporting role, even in their efforts to secure the transportation 
system.  Cross-communication informs a DOT’s vulnerability assessment process and 
emergency response procedures, allowing them to better protect their infrastructure.  But 
this effort then becomes feedback for emergency responders to ensure they can properly 
do their job, as well as ensuring that critical assets important in response efforts are 
maintained.  The coordination effort should not be an attempt to assume the 
responsibilities of law enforcement and other response agencies.  Instead some agencies 
are supplying the skills of DOT personnel to emergency responders to support disaster 
relief.  The New York DOT is one example of an agency that has held training classes 
during which first responders are taught to use DOT snow clearing equipment in the 
event that DOT operators are not available (C. Thomas, personal communication, Oct. 
17, 2008).  
 State DOTs can serve an important position in improving the issues mentioned in 
Chapter 5 and solidifying the role of security in the transportation planning process.  
Standardizing transportation security practices can improve familiarity and reduce errors 
before, during and after an emergency, and coordinating agencies and improving 
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communication can help streamline efforts at all stages.  Yet, as mentioned before, 
funding initiatives in surface transportation security may be an obstacle.  Although they 
may be able to channel some funding for particular strategies, state DOTs will never be 
able to cover all proposals, whether operational or capital investments.  But what agency 
can?  Funding is and will always be an issue for any agency.  Although the efforts of 
congress to assuage this issue may have fallen short, this does not mean that security 
planning has been crippled.  Lack of funds affects other aspects of the planning process in 
the same way. Incorporating security into the planning process may require difficult 
decisions when it comes to capital infrastructure investment, but this incorporation is not 
reliant on money alone.  Incorporating security into the planning process requires a 
paradigm shift because it means considering more than just the mobility requirements of 
today.  Attention must be shifted to the potential breakdown of the transportation system 
from external threats and a consideration of how the transportation system will be able to 
react to those threats to either maintain efficiency or ensure recovery.  Updating the 
transportation system to reflect this perspective will require financial investment, but the 
need to first adopt this perspective cannot be ignored. 
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Chapter 7:  
Recommendations 
 
 
 
 The incorporation of security into the transportation planning process has not 
been accomplished through mandate alone because it cannot be considered simply as 
Step X in the process.  It is also not a singular goal to strive for, and then rest once it is 
accomplished.  As with most of the transportation planning process, security planning 
requires frequent modification as feedback is analyzed.  However, it is a principle that 
can reach into every aspect of the transportation system.   
 Chapter 2 mentioned five roles through which security concerns can be 
incorporated into the normal cycle of decision-making and implementation: Coordinator, 
Analyzer/Planner, Financial Administrator, Infrastructure Owner and Infrastructure 
Operator.  The DOT already performs each of these roles, and each role represents a 
method by which security can become ingrained in the transportation system.  This is not 
to say that a DOT should become a security agency; instead, it is a conceptual 
restructuring that includes security planning in increments, amounting to a more secure 
system as a whole.  A summary of the possible actions and intended goals of these nine 
roles discussed throughout this thesis is presented in Table 5 at the end of this section. 
 Establishing a more solid role as a coordinator appears to be the first step in this 
process.  By solidifying its role as a vital link between relevant agencies, DOTs not only 
guarantee their interests but ensure that the job itself is done.  All of the DOTs 
interviewed for this thesis had established contacts within these relevant agencies, and 
most maintained updated lists of personnel to ensure the persistence of these connections 
and awareness of counterparts within those agencies.   Bringing this to the next level of 
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meaningful interaction may require effort on the part of the DOT, such as calling to 
attention the reasons why other agencies may need DOT security information.  This does 
not mean micro-managing local transportation agencies, but instead could involve 
updates at particular intervals or ensuring that stakeholders are made aware of the 
planning process. 
 This interaction may bring to light relevant standardization issues as methods are 
compared and information is received, and the DOT can resolve these issues both by 
mandating standards and through the process of analyzing and planning the system.  
Through their authority, state DOTs can set standards necessary for proper security 
planning, such as specifying appropriate data formats for vulnerability assessments.  
Through the consideration of security factors in the course of analyzing and planning the 
system, the DOT also sets standards.  These considerations may change the perception of 
how the system should be composed, which in turn affects the infrastructure owned and 
operated by the DOT.  This gradual implementation of standards will then begin to be 
reflected in coordination efforts as personnel are able to communicate more fluidly with 
one another based on a common understanding and perspective.    
 The role of financial administrator is an important one in the process of analyzing 
and planning for the refurbishment or new construction of facilities, as well as the 
training of personnel.  Whereas the vulnerability assessment process may tend to stress 
the immediacy of particular security concerns, this restricts the focus to particular 
projects rather than ensuring the security of the system.  While the need for retroactive 
enhancements cannot be ignored, funding projects on a case-by-case basis may lock the 
security planning process within the concept of only applying it when it is needed.  The 
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funding process must be intertwined with the analyzation and planning process in order 
to ensure that funding choices fit within the broader context of security planning.  This 
means that rather than choosing to fund particular security projects, security needs should 
by highlighted during the planning of the system and considered a part of the project.  
Just as the paving of a new road requires the painting of lines, the introduction of a new 
turnstile in a subway station can include relevant security measures.   
 Incorporating security through these five roles can then be reflected in four 
different DOT roles: Implementer, Regulator, Information Provider, and Influencer.  By 
implementing its own security considerations and regulating the use the system, the DOT 
naturally influences the security of the system.  Its role as an information provider to the 
public through ITS was discussed in Chapter 6, but no less important is its role as an 
information provider to other supporting agencies.  By obtaining and providing 
information necessary for first responders to respond to disasters and for federal agencies 
to evaluate their security policies, the DOT provides valuable information used to 
maintain the security of the transportation system.  And by simply exercising these 
aforementioned abilities, the DOT influences the role of security in any system user. 
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Table 5: A summary of state DOT roles. 
 
Role Action Goal 
Coordinator 
• Establish and maintain a list of 
counterparts among relevant 
agencies 
• Initiate regular meetings for 
updates and stakeholder input 
• Instruct relevant personnel in the 
use of vital transportation 
equipment 
• Establish effective 
communication 
• Solidify a role as a vital 
link between security-
related agencies 
• Clarify roles of 
supporting agencies 
Analyzer/Planner 
• Incorporate security evaluations 
and concerns into the initial 
analysis phase of each new project  
• Perform vulnerability assessments 
on existing infrastructure 
• Establish transportation 
system security 
concerns 
• Incorporate security 
concerns into the early 
stages of the planning 
process 
Financial 
Administrator 
• Incorporate security needs into 
system funding plans instead of 
focusing on funding particular 
security measures  
• Evaluate the effect of funding 
choices on security factors  
• Establish funding for 
security efforts 
Implementer 
• Implement security policies • Ensure planning efforts 
affect transportation 
system 
Infrastructure 
Owner 
• Initiate analyzation and planning 
activities to ensure the security of 
the state transportation system 
• Identify critical transportation 
infrastructure 
• Ensure the capability to maintain 
as well as initiate security 
measures 
• Ensure the security of 
transportation 
infrastructure 
Infrastructure 
Operator 
• Incorporate security plans into 
operational procedures 
• Ensure the 
implementation of 
security measures 
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• Update and maintain COOP plans 
• Gather information necessary to 
effective security planning 
Regulator 
• Ensure standardization of 
communications abilities with law 
enforcement 
• Ensure standards 
• Enforce requirements 
Information 
Provider 
• Increase awareness of ITS 
capabilities among relevant 
coordinating agencies, especially 
emergency responders 
• Effectively 
communicate necessary 
transportation system 
information to support 
disaster response 
Influencer 
• Incorporate security into the 
transportation planning process 
• Influence the security of 
the transportation 
environment and 
related infrastructure 
Source: Author 
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Appendix A:  
 
Emergency Support Function #1 
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Appendix B:  
 
Interview Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Security Planning Questionnaire – State Departments of Transportation 
 
1. How does security planning fit into your current transportation planning process? 
 
a. Is this a direct response to SAFETEA-LU provisions? 
 
b. What components, such as vulnerability assessments or evacuation modeling, 
are you specifically involved in? 
 
2. What funding strategies have you used (or plan to use) to support pre-disaster 
security measures that are proposed as a result of the planning and 
assessment process? 
 
3. What coordination issues have you experienced with external agencies such as 
EMAs, federal agencies or law enforcement agencies? 
 
 
a. What non-transportation agencies do you coordinate with? 
 
 
b. What transportation agencies do you coordinate with? 
 
 
4. What activities does your DOT pursue to promote connection between internal 
personnel and external agencies in regards to security planning? 
 
 
5. Has your DOT experienced any implementation issues in regards to security 
plans or policy? 
 
 
6. What other issues has your DOT experienced in the security planning process?  
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Appendix C: 
 
Critical Asset Factors 
 
 
 
 
Source: A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection 
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Appendix D: 
 
Vulnerability Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection 
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